Abstract: This paper takes another look at the reasons and effects of technological inertia. Resistance to technological change is often regarded as regressive and socially costly, caused by distributional coalitions defending their turf and preserving their rents. While there can be no doubt that sometimes this is a correct view, the reverse argument can be made that in many cases such resistance represents a logical and possibly even socially beneficial source of stability. The paper makes the distinction between the institutional aspects of opposition to technological change (in which the debate regards the rules are laid down and whether the market is permitted to be the arbiter whether a new technique is adopted) and organizational opposition in which resistance takes place within given institutions. Because of technological externalities and network effects, technological systems tend to be much more resilient and inert than individual technologies, and the more the parts of a system are interdependent, the more difficult it is to make changes in it. The net result is one of pathdependence, in which history is one of the main determinants of technological outcomes.
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issue, namely that new technologies will fail to be implemented despite their ostensible economic superiority. For this class of problems, artificial distinctions between the Aeconomic sphere@ and the Apolitical sphere@ are doomed, and we will not even attempt them. The idea that seemingly superior inventions are spurned or rejected is hardly new. In 1679, William Petty wrote that Although the inventor often times drunk with the opinion of his own merit, thinks all the world will invade and incroach upon him, yet I have observed that the generality of men will scarce be hired to make use of new practices, which themselves have not been thoroughly tried... for as when a new invention is first propounded, in the beginning every man objects, and the poor inventor runs the gantloop of all petulent wits...not one [inventor] of a hundred outlives this torture... and moreover, this commonly is so long a doing that the poor inventor is either dead or disabled by the debts contracted to pursue his design.
In this paper, I plan to pursue a somewhat different issue than the disbelief and friction Petty speaks of, namely the purposeful resistance to new technology. Without an understanding of the political economy of technological change, the historical development of economic growth will remain a mystery. The issue of the receptivity of society to new technological ideas is highly relevant to the experience of underdeveloped countries whose failure to adopt best-practice technologies is often regarded as an integral part of underdevelopment. In the very long run, technological progress in its widest sense remains indispensable to sustainable economic growth.
Of course, the failure to adopt a new technology can have many reasons: new technology is often embodied in expensive capital good; it often requires scarce complementary factors such as infrastructural capital or a highly skilled labor force. Yet outright resistance is a widely observed historical phenomenon. 3 The adoption of a wholly new technology is often the target of long debates and public discourse, unlike many other technical and economic choices. The role of persuasion and rhetoric in these decisions is something economists have paid scant attention to, and hence they have not had much success in understanding why, for example, some economies have adopted nuclear power or why some have allowed experimental drugs to be sold and others did not.
Furthermore, not all resistance is purely social. There are instances in which the technological Asystem@ resists a novel and improved component because it does not fit the operation of the whole.
In any event, technological inertia in many societies has often been ascribed to irrationality, technophobia, a blind adherence to traditional but outmoded values and customs. In what follows, I hope to establish two basic propositions. One is that inertia is usually a characteristic widely observed in complex systems that follow an evolutionary dynamic. Second, technological inertia is usually the outcome of rational behavior by utility maximizing individuals, and that we do not have to fall back on differences in preferences to explain why some societies are more amenable to technological change than others.
Rules and Resistance
To simplify matters, define the adoption of a new technique as a binary process: either it is adopted or it is not. Each individual has a set of idiosyncratic exogenous variables (preferences, age, endowments, education, wealth, etc.) which lead him or her to either Asupport@ or Aobject to@ the innovation. To reach this decision, society follows what I will call an aggregation rule, which maps a vector of n individual preferences into a <0,1>
decision. This aggregation rule may be a market process (as would be the case in a pure private economy) but such a rule is a very special case. Any change in technology leads almost inevitably to an improvement in the welfare of some and a deterioration in that of others. To be sure, it is possible to think of changes in production technology that are Pareto superior, but in practice such occurrences are extremely rare. The pure market outcome is equivalent to an aggregator which weights preferences by their income. The optimality of the outcome will vary with the income distribution even for the market aggregator. Unless all individuals accept the Averdict@ of the market outcome, the decision whether to adopt an innovation is likely to be resisted by losers through nonmarket mechanism and political activism. 4 Two recent books dealing with social response to technology, while totally different in tone and background, implore social scientists to pay more attention to the question of resistance to the seemingly inexorable march of new technology. 5 One important distinction should be made between the introduction of a totally new invention in the economy in which it originates, and the transfer of existing technology into new places after it has already been practiced and tried elsewhere. In both cases resistance may emerge, but its nature may differ substantially between the two. Either way, however, markets judge techniques by profitability and thus, as a first approximation, by economic efficiency. How, then, does conflict occur?
To start with, different groups in the economy favor different aggregation rules. In the terminology of the new Historical Institutional Analysis, an aggregator is an institution, that is, a non-technologically determined constraint on economic behavior. 6 If the market outcome rules in favor of one group, another might find it in its interest to circumvent the market process. Suppose that a new technology T 1 is superior to the old T 0 for some individuals belonging to subset S 0 N, but makes those belonging to s 0 N worse off. In general, then, some welfare aggregator G S , so that G S (T 1 ) > G S (T 0 ), and G s such that G s (T 1 ) < G s (T 0 ). If the members of S and s could form separate societies, one of them supports adopting T 1 and the other does not. Because they cannot, resistance can be interpreted as the attempt of the members of s to abandon the dic tates of the aggregation rule in place (for example, the market) and to impose a different aggregator on the economy such as a regulating or licensing agency. 7 It is possible that the number of members in s is larger than that in its complement s~. In that case there will be a difference between the market, in which Avotes@ are weighted by expenditures and a democratic process, where each person has one vote. 8 In decisions about technology, at least, there could be a serious inconsistency between democracy and continuous innovation. 9 In other words, unlike the optimism of 6 The terminology is borrowed from Avner Greif, AMicro Theory and the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History,@ prepared for a symposium on Economic history at the 7th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Tokyo 1995. Press, 1995. 8 It clearly is highly ironic to cite here a prominent Indian businessman, Titoo Ahluwalia as saying that Athe average Indian has two sides to him. There is one side that is a consumer and one that is a voter.@ Business Week, Oct. 23, 1995, p. 50. 9 The notion that democracy endangers technological creativity was particularly embraced by nineteenth century reactionary writers opposed to the extension of the franchise such as Sir Henry Maine who argued that Universal suffrage would have prevented most of the major technological breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution. See Albert Hirschman, free market advocates in the Friedman tradition, it may well be that democratic decision processes do not maximize the long-term economic welfare of economies. This dilemma faced by democratic countries which wish to undergo rapid development has long been recognized. 10 Barbara Ward explained that uncontrolled market decisions will create intolerable gaps in income distribution and thus resistance of new technology, and totalitarian dictatorships would implement technologies regardless of cost. ABut in India,@ she adds, Aa balance has always to be struck, the dilemma is never absent.@ Yet in her view this is precisely India's strength, since whatever modernization is introduced is usually based on a consensus and thus unlikely to ignite political explosions.
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The Rhetoric of Reaction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 97-100, who adds that the argument was palpably absurd and immediately proven to be so. Yet it is not impossible that democracy could under certain circumstances be less hospitable than other political regimes to technological progress.
The reasons why members of S and s prefer different aggregation rules need some elaboration. Press, 1990, pp. 170-73, 200-06. and thus somehow evil in itself. The literature on this issue is rather large and cannot be done justice to here.
14 At this stage, I will assume identical utility functions and attribute the differences in opinion to observable parameters such as differences in information, economic costs, and endowments. Proposed technological changes are expected to benefit one segment of society and harm another; the market may determine one outcome, which could be circumvented by another aggregator.
14 For a historiographical introduction, see Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977, pp. 107-34. Formally, we may distinguish between the following decision rules. G M , which is the pure market aggregator means that the new technology will be adopted by profit-maximizing firms following exclusively the dictates of the market. G D is a decision rule that designates an authorized subset such as representative parliament or a panel of technical experts, a violent mob, a court, or a single dictator, to decide whether to permit and/or support the new technology. G V is a voting rule, say one-person-one-vote, in which a new technology is voted in or out by some kind of referendum. In most realistic situations the actual decision rule or aggregator which maps individual preferences to the decision space <0,1> is G = αG M + βG D + (1-α-β)G V where α+β#1. The pure market outcome occurs only when α = 1. The social decision process may thus be viewed as consisting of two stages. First, society determines the political rules of the game, that is, it sets α and β. Then, depending on the aggregator chosen, it determines whether the new technique will be adopted or not. An obvious elaboration of the simple model is that one decision maker may delegate decisions to another: the authorized subset can decide to hand things over to a referendum or leave it up to the market. An election, on the other hand, can appoint a body of people delegated to make the decision or do nothing at all so that the decision to adopt is effectively left to the market. The interpretation of α and β as probabilities or proportions of the Acases@ that are decided in one arena or another thus lends some intuitive meaning to G.
A great deal of political and social struggle involves not only the implementation of new technology itself, but the decision rules themselves, as it is reasonably believed that some decision rules favor one interest group more than another. Economists, in particular, are concerned by the size of α, that is, how much of the decision is left to the market and how much will be decided on by other aggregators. In part, the aggregator will be determined by the nature of the product: technological change in public goods and other areas of market failure will be obviously largely outside the market decision process; but there is a huge gray area of private goods where there is room for political action. It may be thought that societies will be more creative and technologically successful the larger α, but this is by no means certain. It may well be that the free market, for reasons of its own, foregoes technological opportunities. For instance, the new technology may require unusually large capital spending or a coordination between existing firms that cannot be materialized without direct intervention. In that case, the government may step in to make up for the market failure. Pre-revolutionary France, especially, saw a great deal of government involvement in trying to encourage French entrepreneurs to accept British techniques.
When the aggregator has been decided upon, as long as α < 1, so that --as is often the case --some non-market decision is necessary to approve the new technology, opposition occurs within given political structures, such as a courtroom or a parliamentary committee. Of course, many new technologies are too trifling to be the matter of public debate; one hears little of a public outcry over the switch, say, from spark-plugs to fuel injection or from dot-matrix to ink-jet printers. In those cases the decision will normally be delegated to the market. But when there are major technical choices that involve public expenditures, complementary or substitute relations with other technologies, or other types of spillover effects, they will end up being judged by non-market criteria.
15 Similarly, uncertainty of any nature regarding possible externalities, especially when these concern public health and safety, almost invariably lead to a reduction of the market component in the aggregator. In those cases, political lobbying about the new technology is natural. The usual rules of political economy and collective decision-making by interest groups apply, with the additional complications that the introduction of a new technology is by definition a highly uncertain event, involving known and unknown dangers that play no role in, say, 15 The adoption of fluoridation of drinking water in the United States, the use of insecticide in mosquito abatement, and all matters pertaining to military technology are prime examples of such public technical choices. political decisions about tariff policy or public work procurements. Moreover, the technical and scientific issues are often highly complex and even a phrasing of the correct questions (let alone the answers) is often beyond the intellectual capability of decision makers. Precisely for that reason, there is more reliance on the opinion of Aexperts@ but also, paradoxically, a frequent appeal to emotions, fears, and religious and nationalist sentiments. As litigation becomes increasingly important, technological decisions are relegated to courts, and rhetorical imagery and other persuasive tools, from TV ads to neighborhood rallies, become a means by which technological decisions are made. Reliance on technical expertise, a long-standing practice in the West, is weakened by disagreements among experts and even disagreements as to who is an expert to begin with. Vol. 23 (1994), pp. 561-74. been the rule rather than the exception. It is our own age, and especially the rapid technological change in the Western World, that is the historical aberration. Another implication is that most underdeveloped countries cannot take technology transfer for granted. Even when capital is available and complementary inputs such as skilled labor and infrastructure are present, attempts to transplant technology from one society to another are likely to run into social barriers that economists may find difficult to understand. Before we can delve into the economic and social causes of resistance, we need to place its importance in a theoretical framework.
Inertia and Evolution
Many scholars have recognized that new techniques emerge in a manner that is in some ways analogous to the emergence of new species and variations on existing ones in the evolution of living beings. 21 The choice of techniques is akin to the process of natural selection; natural selection is really a metaphor for an impersonal process in which no concrete entity actually does the selecting. New technologies are similarly selected (although here at least in some cases the selecting is done by conscious individuals making deliberate choices). The market is of course one arena in which this selection takes place; the political sphere is another. 21 For a recent summary see Joel Mokyr, "Evolution and Technological Change: a new Metaphor for Economic History?" in Robert Fox, ed., Technological Change. London: Harwood publishers, 1996, pp. 63-83. Despite the seemingly unbelievable diversity of life forms, actual phenotypical change is quite unusual and runs into many barriers. The understanding that natural selection is inherently a conservative process was first emphasized by Alfred Russel Wallace, who likened natural selection to a governor on a steam engine, essentially a device to correct deviations automatically. The eminent biologist Gregory Bateson who points this out, notes that the rate of evolution is limited by the barrier between phenotypic and genotypic change so that acquired characteristics are not passed on to future generations; by sexual reproduction which guarantees that the DNA blueprint of the new does not conflict too much with that of the old; and by the inherent conservatism of the developing embryo which necessarily involves a convergent process he call epigenesis. 22 System externalities have an equivalent in biology known as "structural constraints." Genetic material is transmitted in "packages" and thus sticks together. The information transmitted from generation to generation does not consist of independent and separately optimizable pieces. A "little understood principle of correlated development" (as Darwin called it)
implies that certain features develop not because they increase fitness but because they are correlated with other developments. We now know why this is so: genetic linkage causes genes that are located in close proximity on the chromosome to be inherited. At the same time, evolution tends to be localized and cannot change too much at once. As François Jacob put it in a famous paper, evolution does not so much create as tinker: it works with what is available, odds and ends, and much of it involves therefore minor variations on existing structures. 23 Selection
Furthermore, the emergence of new species (speciation), analogous to the emergence of new techniques, is both rare and poorly understood. Although the resistance to change in natural systems is of an entirely different nature than that in technological systems, it too implies a cohesive force that limits the amount and rate of change. As Mayr has recently explained, AJust exactly what controls this cohesion is still largely unknown, but its existence is abundantly documented...during the pre-Cambrian period, when the cohesion of eukaryote genotype was still very loose, seventy or more morphological types (phyla) formed. Throughout evolution there has been a tendency for a progressive Acongealing@ of the genotype so that deviation from a longestablished morphological type has become more and more difficult.@ While such genetic cohesion has of course not precluded the well-known adaptive radiations which created different species, these explosions of variety are little more than ad hoc variations on a bauplan or structural type. 25 This cohesion, as Mayr emphasizes, while not wholly understood, is essential to the development of the world of living species: the key to success is to strike a compromise between excessive conservatism and excessive malleability. Evolutionary systems, whether biological or other, that are too conservative will end up in complete stasis; too much receptivity to change will result in chaos.
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In the economic history of technology we may have been more fortunate. Radically new technological ideas, from antibiotics to nuclear power to telegraphy, have emerged time and again despite the odds against them.
Yet the dynamic may be similar: a system which struggles to change against built-in inertia is more likely to change in sudden bursts than in slow, continuous fashion. The idea of Apunctuated equilibria@ in evolutionary change can be projected to historical processes to cast light on the question why so much of historical change occurs in concentrated spurts of intense technological activity such as the British Industrial Revolution. 27 Most recent research in modern evolutionary biology suggests that the dynamic of evolution, too, proceeded in intensive
The analogy with evolutionary biology underlines the rather unlikely nature of continuous technological progress. Stability in the systems of living beings is maintained by what biologists term genetic cohesion.
Similarly, technology is subject to technological cohesion, basically meaning that on the whole technological systems will be stable and inert. It could be the case, of course, that the agents of change, whether they are mutations in DNA or new ideas occurring to people, are themselves highly nonlinear in their frequency. It is more plausible, however, to assume that changes in Amutagens@ are relatively rare and that mutations occur at more or less uniform rates but are constrained by the inertia and resistance to change within the system. The likelihood of change taking place depends on the outcome of the struggle between novelty, thirsting for a chance to take its place, and the old, fearful of any threat to the status quo. As Wesson (1991, p. 149) has pointed out, "the most ensured that cases in which a superior technology would be rejected would be rare, but also understood the fragility of capitalism in democratic society.
In the context of a struggle between the status quo and novelty, the non-linear dynamic of historical evolution becomes more plausible. The technological status quo will create barriers that make it more difficult for new ideas to catch on, and at times may succeed in rigging the decision-making process so that novelty becomes almost impossible. Once these dams are broken, however, the torrent of innovation may be unstoppable, at least for a while. Precisely if the political arguments are not cast in terms of the perceived costs and benefits of the new technology itself but rather in terms of the rules that are to be followed in making these decisions, such nonlinearities become understandable.
The story becomes considerably more involved but also richer when we regard not only technology but also institutions as subject to evolutionary forces. Douglass C. North has stressed the idea that institutions evolve in that their dynamic can be described by stochastic shocks subject to selective filters, even if not all the implications of this approach were fully explored. 30 What we have, then, is two evolutionary systems, one epistemological (technology) and one political and social (formal institutions, customs, and other informal rules of behavior) that co-evolve over time. 31 An example is the emergence of American industrial capitalism after the Civil War, in which the technology of interchangeable parts and mass production assembly lines implied an enormous growth in the optimal scale of much of the manufacturing. This technology co-evolved with changes in the structure of business institutions, including the emergence of the modern hierarchical business corporation, labor unions, and the growth in efficiency and scope of capital and labor markets. 32 Such a continuous interactive coevolution means that if a foreign technology were transplanted into a society where the adapted institutions had not evolved jointly, serious incongruities and disruptions could be the result. The consequent resistance to technological change can, in this fashion, be reinterpreted in a wider context.
Markets or Politics?
Although the terminology here is different, the concept of heterogeneous aggregators is closest to the such decisions are of course made by individuals, in most societies discontinuous and discrete changes in the main technique in use involve to some extent public decision making. Patents have to be issued, environmental impact statements are filed, and in many cases outright licences and support from some public authority are required.
33 33 An example would be the adoption of railroads after the 1830s, which involved varying combinations of private and public decision making in different countries. In Britain, the decision to adopt railways was largely a private decision made in the context of the free market; in other countries the government played a direct entrepreneurial role.
When, then, will opposition to the market as the arbiter of innovations emerge? To start with, assume for the sake of argument simply that all utility functions contain only income as an argument, and that the only effect that the transition from T 0 to T 1 has is to increase the real income of s~ individuals, to reduce the real income of s individuals such that 3 s~d Y|T 1 > -3 s dY|T 1 . This means that the invention is socially preferable, but the potential for conflict is only resolved if the gainers use part of their augmented incomes to compensate the losers.
Compensation would seem at first glance a reasonable way to resolve the problem but in fact rarely occurs directly because of the formidable problems of identifying the losers, measuring the dimensions of their loss and overcoming the problems of moral hazard among losers as well as collective action amongst gainers. All the same, compensation does occur. The welfare and farm support systems in modern Western economies could be interpreted at least in part as mechanisms designed to compensate and placate groups that ended up at the short end of the stick in rapid industrialization and subsequent de-industrialization. If compensation does not occur, the losers will have an interest to band together to try to change the social decision rule from G M to a rule that is more favorable to them. The way for them to do this is to circumvent the market, in our terms by reducing α and then try to affect the aggregator G D and/or G V by political action. It is in this fashion that persuasion and rhetoric enter the story; in a Apure@ market system, they need not enter the debate.
A major reason why people tend to remove the market as the sole arbiter of technological decisions and delegate part of the decision-making process to political bodies is that markets effectively truncate preferences over technology at zero. If one supports a new technique, one can vote Ayes@ by buying the new product or switching to the new technique. By not buying the product or refusing to switch, one can express indifference or dislike, but individuals have no control over what others do even if they feel it might affect them. In markets it is difficult to express a Ano@ vote. Another reason is that so much technology is part of the public sector: transport, public health, infrastructure, and the military require political approval of changes simply because these are sectors in which some form of prior market failure has been observed.
Above all, consumers seem to distrust the free market as an arbiter of new technology just because it is new. Whereas in a technologically static economy there may be no reason to distrust the invisible hand, the informational asymmetries and irreversibilities associated with the generation and adoption of new techniques seem to demand a cool and unbiased arbiter. It is feared that greedy entrepreneurs will sell asbesto-type products to the public and then abscond. Thalidomyde-type of disasters, however small compared with the benefits of advances in medical technology, produce a constant demand for government assurances that new products and techniques are safe. At the same time it needs stressing that not all resistance to technological progress is necessarily conservative and in defense of some technological status quo. Many cases of social resistance to a new technique occur because there are two alternatives to T 0 , T 1 and T 2 . Left to the market, T 1 will be chosen; if some interest group wishes to use non-market mechanisms to bring about some alternative T 2 , it is the nature of technological change they wish to influence, not its very existence. reducing. Below I provide a typology of some of the more obvious sources of purely rational resistance to innovation.
a. Unemployment. One obvious reason, widely believed since Ricardo's famous chapter on AMachinery,@ is that labor-saving technological change reduces the demand for undifferentiated labor thus leading to unemployment and a possible decline in wages. As economists have long understood, this statement in and of itself cannot be accepted without working through the general equilibrium properties of an exogenous change in the production function. An invention that replaces workers by machines will have effects on all product and factor markets. An increase in the efficiency of production which reduces the price of one good, will increase real income and thus increase demand for other goods; the replaced workers may find employment in other industries, and their real wage may go up or down. In an abstract general equilibrium world, without adjustment costs, in which all workers and productive assets can be costlessly converted from one usage to another, there is no a priori expectation that changes in production technology will necessarily reduce labor income and employment. In the real world, of course, temporary disequilibria can cause hardship to large subgroups of the population. Yet in some of the most widely studied instances, the feared patterns of technological unemployment did not materialize.
Nineteenth century Britain did not suffer from a secular increase in structural employment feared by Ricardo and the Luddites alike. In a very different environment, it was widely feared that the mechanization of agriculture in Asia in the 1970s would lead to widespread rural unemployment; this did not occur. 35 by machines of different efficiency. The lowest ranked machine earns a rent of zero; all other machines earn a rent that is proportional to the difference between the production cost of the least efficient machine in use and their own. The value of the asset can thus be determined by the p.d.v. formula, in which the value of the asset is a function of this difference and expected future technological depreciation. A rise in the rate of technological change will reduce the market value of existing machines of older vintage and thus it might be expected that the owners will find a way to avert it if they can.
Yet in practice this happens rarely. The cases in which the owners of physical capital have fought against the introduction of new techniques are comparatively few. The reason must be that while the physical qualities of machines can only rarely be altered, capital goods --including ownership in patents --can be bought and sold.
37
Thus the owner of a set of machines that become obsolete will take a loss on those machines, but he can always buy into the new technology by buying the new machines that yield the higher profits through lower costs. This explains, for instance, the relatively weak resistance to the introduction of steam engines despite the huge locational rents that were being secured by the owners of water mill sites. Industrialists using water power might have been losing when their mills fell into disuse, but they could make up for those losses by buying into steam technology themselves, which is precisely what happened in Lancashire during the British Industrial Revolution. In 37 It is critical for this argument that patents do not categorically exclude some existing producers from licensing patents or having them assigned to them. When this happens, it is of course quite likely that existing producers will not be able to jump the new bandwagon. For a survey of how common patent licensing and assignment already was in nineteenth century America, see Naomi Lamoureaux and Kenneth Sokoloff, A Long-term Change in the Organization of Inventive Activity,@ presented at the National Academy of Sciences Colloquium on Science, Technology, and the Economy, Irvine, CA., Oct. 20-22, 1995. those cases in which capital markets favored some existing producers over others, however, this principle is violated and in such cases resistance is to be expected. c. Non-pecuniary losses. Another source of resistance to technological change is that it changes not just the level of average costs, but the overall shape of the cost function. While new technology thus reduces overall costs and increases efficiency, it may also change the minimum efficient size of the firm and the entry conditions to the industry. Thus, when the minimum efficient size of firms in the textile industry was hugely increased during the first Industrial Revolution, artisans and small domestic producers were effectively driven out of the industry. In a world without transactions-and information costs and hence Aperfect@ capital markets, the costs of these changes would be mitigated by small producers combining into large firms and exploiting some of the economies of scale. This did occur at a larger scale than is usually appreciated.
39 The so-called Aworkshop system@ in which workers hired space and a piece of equipment in a large building and worked on their own account without hierarchy and discipline was prominent in many industries until deep into the nineteenth century. All the same, during the British Industrial Revolution even before the famous Luddite and Captain Swing disturbances, there were some riots by artisans and self-employed producers threatened by factories.
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Workers, moreover, care about such non-pecuniary characteristics of the work-place from safety and noise on the shopfloor to job satisfaction and decision-making authority. If new technology affects these characteristics negatively, workers will resist unless they can be bought off by employers through fully-compensating wage increases or unless they can find new jobs similar to their old ones at zero cost to themselves. During the Industrial Revolution, a particular bone of contention was the attempt by employers to standardize products and reduce the leeway that artisans and domestic workers had in setting the parameters of the product. When the advantages of product standardization led to lower tolerance boundaries on the characteristics of output, from cotton cloth to musket balls, repeated attempts to enforce such standards ran into determined opposition.
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Beyond that, technological change affects the regional distribution of production and employment, thus forcing Press, 1996, chs. 4-5. workers to move from one region to another or from a rural to an urban area. New technology is often felt to destroy traditional communities. For some members of those communities that counts for little whereas others care about it a great deal; thus any kind of aggregator will lead almost inevitably to some subset of the population being dissatisfied.
d-Human Capital. The opportunities for conflict are much wider when we consider human capital.
42 Skills and experience are acquired over a lifetime, but the ability to learn new skills declines over the life cycle. 43 Workers beyond the student or apprentice stage can be expected to resist new techniques insofar that innovation makes their skills obsolete and thus irreversibly reduces their expected life-time earnings. The new technology may be inaccessible to them for more reason than one; factories require a willingness to submit to discipline and hierarchy that the independent artisan was too proud to submit to. It is of no consolation to the older generation that their children may have no difficulty adjusting to the new regime, mastering the new technique and thus improve their material standard of living. Again, the example of the British Industrial Revolution illustrates this point vividly. As the old domestic industries came increasingly under pressure from the more efficient factories, the older artisans by and large refrained from seeking employment in them; the reliance of factories on child and teenage labor was motivated by the ability of youths to learn the skills and adopt the docility required for the factory environment.
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42 In a formal analysis of the emergence of resistance among skilled workers, Krusell and Ríos-Rull ingeniously capture an example of this kind of problem. They model an economy in which all capital is technology-specific human capital, and show that older workers who have invested in a skill that is specific to a technology threatened by obsolescence can be modeled as a "vested interest" for whom it is optimal to try to block the new technology. See Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Ríos-Rull, "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth." Unpublished manuscript, 1992. For an analysis along similar lines and the important constraint on the effectiveness of such resistance by the openness of the economy, see Thomas J. Holmes and James A. Schmitz, AResistance to New Technology and Trade Between Areas,@ Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1995. 43 As The Economist put it recently, AWhat grown-up who spent years of childhood learning to tie shoes, to count to ten, to parse Greek or to find triple integrals does not now sigh at having to lipread the baffling instructions for a video recorder or for Windows 95? Almost every generation gets overtaken in some department of knowledge as new discoveries and unfamiliar technologies replace yesterday=s learning.@ See ACranks and Proud of it,@ The Economist, Jan. 20, 1996, pp. 86-87. The protection of skills and specific human capital is often combined with other forms of rent-seeking through the creation of barriers to entry and the control of output. This is clearly a widespread interpretation of the European craft-guild system which ruled urban artisans in many areas for many centuries. In pre-modern urban Europe these guilds enforced and eventually froze the technological status quo.
46 Similar phenomena, mutatis mutandis, occurred in China. 47 It is important to stress that many of those guilds were originally set up to 46 Kellenbenz, for example, states that "guilds defended the interests of their members against outsiders, and these included the inventors who, with their new equipment and techniques, threatened to disturb their members' economic status. They were just against progress." Herman Kellenbenz, "Technology in the Age of the Scientific Revolution, 1500-1700." In Carlo Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe 1974, Vol. 2, p. 243. Much earlier Pirenne pointed out that "the essential aim [of the craft guild] was to protect the artisan, not only from external competition, but also from the competition of his fellow-members." The consequence was "the destruction of all initiative. No one was permitted to harm others by methods which enabled him to produce more quickly and more cheaply than they. Technical progress took on the appearance of disloyalty. fulfill different functions acting as clearing houses for information, organizational devices to set-up training, mutual insurance support organizations, and sincere attempts to prevent opportunism and free riding on others=
reputations. Yet over time many of them degenerated into technologically conservative bodies.
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48 In a recent paper, S.R. Epstein has defended the technological role of craft guilds, pointing out that they fulfilled an important role in the dissemination and intergenerational transmission of technical information. There is no contradiction between such a role and the inherently conservative role played by craft guilds. More controversial is his claim that guilds provided a cloak of secrecy which worked as a protection of the property rights for inventors. Even if such a system could be demonstrated to have existed, most authorities are in agreement that eventually much of the guild system was overtaken by technologically reactionary forces which instead of protecting innovators threatened them. See S.R. Epstein, ACraft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological change in pre-modern Europe,@ mimeo., London School of Economics, 1995. An extreme example is the printers= guild, one of the most powerful and conservative guilds in Europe which steadfastly resisted any innovation and as late as 1772 legally restrained one of its members from building an improved press. Cf. In most of Europe, then, craft guilds eventually became responsible for a level of regulation that stifled competition and innovation. They did this by laying down meticulous rules about three elements of production that we might term "the three p's": prices, procedures, and participation. As guilds gained in political power, they tried as much as they could to weaken market forces as aggregators and tended increasingly to freeze technology in its tracks. The regulation of prices was inimical to technological progress because process innovation by definition reduces costs, and the way through which the inventor makes his profits is by underselling his competitors.
Regulating prices may still have allowed some technological progress because innovators could have realized increased profits through lowering costs even if they could not undersell their competitors. To prevent this, procedures stipulated precisely how a product was supposed to be made and such technical codes, while originally designed to deal with legitimate concerns such as reputation for quality, eventually caused production methods to ossify altogether. Enforcing these procedures, however, was far more difficult than enforcing pre-set prices.
Finally, and in the long run perhaps the most effective brake on innovation, was participation: by limiting and controlling the number of entrants into crafts, and by forcing them to spend many years in apprenticeship and journeymanship, guild members infused them with the conventions of the technological status quo and essentially cut off the flow of fresh ideas and the cross-fertilization between branches of knowledge that so often is the taproot of technological change. 49 A particularly pernicious custom was the rigid division of labor between craft guilds so that each guild was confined to its designed occupation, a practice that required from time royal intervention to prevent egregious abuses. 50 Thus in the 1560s, three Parisian coppersmiths invented improved morions (military helmets), but were prevented from producing them because the armorers held the exclusive rights to defensive weapons. In this case they were overruled by King Charles IX. Cf. Henry Heller, Labour, Science, and Technology in France, 1500 -1620 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 inventor was not a registered cabinetmaker. The suit was dismissed when the court made his workshop an "Imperial privileged factory." 51 The role of the guilds can go some way in explaining the series of technological successes we usually refer to as the British Industrial Revolution and why it occurred in Britain as opposed to the European Continent, although clearly this was only one of many variables at work. 52 Resistance was not confined to manufacturing; when large department stores were introduced into Germany following the French model in the later nineteenth century, small shopkeepers banded together and were able to convince the major states in Germany to pass a special tax on large stores to protect the small merchants from the threat of modernization. 52 In pre-revolutionary France the network of craft guilds and small producers, often supported by local authorities, was adamantly opposed to all technical innovation. See Pierre Deyon and Philippe Guignet, "The Royal Manufactures and Economic and Technological Progress in France before the Industrial Revolution,".Journal of European Economic History Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1980) , pp. 611-32. The Crown did its best to circumvent this conservative force by awarding privileges, pensions, and monopolies to successful innovators and inventors. Needless to say, resistance to innovation before the Industrial Revolution took many forms, not all of which depended on the guilds. In the past century resistance to new production technology has come in part from labor unions. There is no compelling reason why labor unions must always resist technological change: after all, as Aencompassing organizations@ they ought also to be aware of the undeniable benefits that new technology brings to their members qua consumers. 56 The growth of the labor movement=s power in Britain is often held responsible for the declining In our own time, labor unions have been held responsible for impeding technological progress in many industries. In the European and American auto industry, for instance, they have resisted the closing of outdated plants and the introduction of the flexible work practices and reduced job classifications that have increased the efficiency of Japanese car manufacturers. 62 Needless to say, not all unions have taken a consistently conservative stance against new technology: in post-1945 Sweden and Germany, for example, unions were induced to join coalitions aimed at increasing productivity. These unions were large and encompassing groups, and as the Olsonian theory suggests, their membership benefitted enough from technological progress for the benefits to outweigh the costs.
e-Externalities. The non-pecuniary aspects of new technology raise particular concerns when there are Aexternal effects@ that is, when new technology affects common resources. Much of the resistance by the environmental movement to superfast railroads, nuclear power, and advanced pesticides, for instance, deals precisely with the non-income effects of technological change. Again, such non-pecuniary effects are valued differently by different individuals and thus the outcome that political aggregators determine will differ from the market outcome. In the standard case of externalities, common resources are not priced at their marginal social cost. In a static economy, arrangements will often emerge that minimize such discrepancies. New technology compounds the transaction costs with information problems. Thus, it is difficult enough to limit the use of known atmospheric pollutants, but far harder to enforce agreements when the damage is unknown or in dispute. Unknown effects on shared resources thus aggravate disagreement and political resistance to technological progress.
To conclude, then, there are good reasons for subgroups within an economy to try to dethrone the free market as the sole aggregator, that is, to disallow the competitive price mechanism by itself to determine which technologies will be adopted and which will not. This effort has been undeniably successful; almost everywhere some kind of non-marketing control and licensing system has been introduced that has some agency or group of experts approve new technology before it is brought to the market. outcome of such a decision-making process differ substantially from the outcome of the market, and what are the sources of disagreement and debate between the different groups?
Political action within an aggregator.
Given that society has determined the aggregator, that is, the Arules of the game@ by which decisions are made, do social resistance and political action still make sense? Obviously, unless α = 1, the non-market game is only beginning. Once the arena has been chosen, interest groups and ideologically committed activists will concentrate on getting the outcome they desire. The nature of the debate will differ of course depending on the arena and the motives of the opposition and in particular there is a distinction between the adoption of known technologies by developing economies, and that of new, wholly untried, technologies by economies on the technological frontier. We may distinguish the following forms of political action.
a Lobbying. The pure case in which the Alosers@ discussed above lobby to get it rejected. Persuasion and political agitation do not make much sense if the distribution of gains over the population is continuous since in that case every decision maker already has made up his or her mind and nobody is strictly indifferent; in practice however there are likely to be discontinuities in the distribution, leaving a large number of Avoters@ indifferent to the implementation of T 1 . These voters would be Arationally indifferent,@ that is, because they have no or a small stake in the outcome, it is hardly worth their while to master the often intricate details of new technologies. Lobbying then involves an attempt to persuade these Aindifferent voters@ to support or resist the new technology. In this context Olson's notions of the Logic of Collective Action are central. When the losses are concentrated, as they often are, the losers are likely to be more easy to organize and have more political clout even if the social gains outweigh the losses.
b Strategic behavior and logrolling. It may be sensible in some cases to pretend to object to some technologies as part of a bargaining strategy. For instance, as already noted, workers may actually stand to benefit from a new technology, but may find it in their interest to resist it in order to eventually secure a larger part of the new technology or perhaps secure increased rents elsewhere. There is historical evidence of the use of resistance to innovations as a bargaining chip even when the interests of both sides are unclear. 63 When a new and more 63 As Martin points out in his analysis of the British newspaper debate, Ait is rarely the case that a management efficient technology is introduced, there are rents to be dissipated; it makes sense for unions to resist the new technology unless they can be guaranteed an acceptable proportion of the rents generated. 64 Furthermore, if there is more than one negotiation going on at one time, groups may be trading-off support or resistance for technologies that they actually do not care much about in order to secure support for their position on decisions that affect them directly.
c Correlation effects. Often new technology is viewed and depicted as Apackaged@ in a cultural-political deal that is undesirable even if the new technology in and of itself is. This kind of ambiguity flavors much of the political argument in non-Western nations and often is coupled with a cultural suspicion of foreigners. There is a sense that Athe magical identity is development=modernisation=Westernization.@ Especially when new technology takes the form of new products, it is often regarded to be correlated with undesirable cultural and social sidetotally united behind technological change is opposed by unions or employees totally opposed.@ Martin, ANew Technology in Fleet Street.@, p. 204. Within management and within workers there are often conflicting interests at work, and it is often as hard to predict which position each side is going to take as it is to predict the outcome. 64 The most detailed work on the subject has been carried out by William Lazonick on the cotton industry. His conclusion is worth repeating: "Vested interests ---in particular the stake that British workers had in job control and the historic underdevelopment of British management ---stood in the way of ... promoting the diffusion of advanced production methods." See William Lazonick "Theory and History in Marxian Economics." In The Future of Economic History, edited by Alexander J. Field, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1987, p. 303 . Labor viewed the adoption of new machines with "acute suspicion." Rather than block the new machinery altogether, however, their resistance was often veiled in increased demands. To secure labor's acceptance, management had to make concessions that reduced the profitability of new machinery (Peter Payne, "Entrepreneurship and British Economic Decline." In British Culture and Economic Decline, edited by Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 25-58). effects. It is then rejected by some, not because of its inherent economic characteristics but because of these externalities. The history of India, for one, illustrates this well. Headrick sums up the issue as follows:
AThe colonized [nations] were in an ambiguous position. Western technology had led to their defeat and captivity and threatened their culture and way of life. No one illustrates their ambivalent attitudes toward Western technology quite as well as Mohandas K. Ghandi, who wore handwoven garments made of homespun yarn but also used a watch, traveled by train, and kept in touch with his followers by telephone.@ Such packaging of culture and technology can take other forms. Some new technologies have been argued to have especially negative effects on women, children, or members of other special social groups. When this occurs, resistance to the new technology may occur just because these groups are deemed by some to be vulnerable and thus worthy of protection even if they themselves stand to benefit from it. A prominent example of this type or argument is the work of Vanadana Shiva, whose work combines Feminism, Environmentalism, and a fierce suspicion of Western Technology. 67 In the West, too, technological progress was associated with powerful groups from which individuals felt alienated. Thus, technological resistance against, say, nuclear power, might be viewed as Aa blow to big business or big science.@ Sociological studies suggest, however, that such resistance is fairly rare. 68 Some of the historical suspicion against new technology was related to its effects favoring commercialization. Most technological change affects the proportion of total output that goes through the market.
The Green Revolution, with its heavy reliance on purchased inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), has raised serious objections on the basis of the alleged disruptions and violence that market penetration caused to selfsufficient small communities thus causing the Adepeasantization of the peasantry@. 69 In principle, however, technological progress can be either market enhancing or market curtailing. Many of the household appliances developed during the twentieth century led to home production of cleaning and cooking services that previously were carried out by hired household labor. Another correlation effect is the fear the new technology will lead to rationalization and secularization, undermining the power of religion and Atraditional values.@ Finally, correlation effects may occur simply when a new technique is somehow associated with a group that is disliked. Thus the introduction of quinine was delayed into England because it had been brought to Europe by the Jesuits and was 67 Shiva argues that modern technology destroys nature and is thus Aassociated with violence to women who depend on nature for drawing sustenance for themselves, their families, their societies.@ The Industrial Revolution created a Adomination and mastery of men over nature [which was] also associated with new patterns of domination and mastery over women. Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development. London: Zed Books, 1988, pp. xvi-xvii. known as AJesuit Powder.@ 70 d Irreversibilities and path dependence. Another possibility occurs when a new technology is initially adopted, but subsequently some new information emerges or some change in preferences occurs that makes people change their minds. In that case the aggregator G itself remains but the outcome changes, so that G(T 1 * I)
> G(T 0 * I) but G(T 1 * I') < G(T 0 * I'), where T 1 and T 0 are the two techniques and I and I' are two information sets.
The very nature of new technological information is that it is irreversible, once learned, it is difficult if not will eventually lead to markets in organs or that the ability to identify the gender of foetuses through amniotic fluid tests may eventually lead to selective abortion to achieve gender selection. ACyberphobia@ is in part based on the futuristic fear that impersonal and inhuman machines would eventually govern society, and that the differences between people and machines would eventually become hazy. In vitro fertilization techniques have resulted in a fear of the mechanization of the human reproductive process and fluoridation of drinking water have raised concerns about socialized medicine but also about the (perhaps more realistic) power of a state to affect unsuspecting individuals through the control of a network technology such as water supply. 73 There is a fear that new technologies that initially work well, will veer out of control and like Frankenstein eventually turn on their creators. Precisely because so many new technologies ended up being used in totally different ways than they were originally intended, there is a justified fear that by producing new knowledge, we may be unleashing, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, something we may not control. The fundamental sense of concern is that some forms technological change lead to a slippery slope toward some vaguely perceived but unacceptable future outcome, 72 An example would be the campaign conducted by the Foundation on Economic Trends, a Washington lobby dedicated to fighting the spread of biotechnology. As of now, there is no registered case of any damage caused by biotechnology. Yet the fear persists that if these technologies took off, somehow others would emerge that would be extremely harmful. 73 Fluoridation was first introduced in the United States in 1945, but in 1992 only 62 percent of Americans using public water enjoyed its benefits. In Western states, where the aggregator took the form of referenda rather than an imposition by elected representatives, adoption rates were generally lower (2 percent in Nevada, 16 percent in California). This reflects classical Luddite skepticism about Amass medication@ but also correlation effects such as Amistrust of big government.@ There is no evidence of any negative side-effect of fluoridation except a minor discoloration of teeth when the quantities are higher than optimal. See Scientific American Volume 274, No. 2 (Feb. 1996) p. 20. which --while never absolute --has affected much of the underlying thinking of opponents. 74 A generalization of the Pandora Effect would be that all might agree to prefer T 1 to T 0 but if T 1 leads in high probability to T 2 ... T n and T n is less desirable than T 0, It may well be the case that today we would be better off without knowing how to release nuclear energy, but this option no longer exists. Install Equa tion Editor and doubleclick here to view equation.
look remarkably similar. Precisely because of the unknown consequences of new technology, persuasion, pressure, and propaganda (that is, political action) will inevitably remain part of technological decisions.
In practice, it is difficult to disentangle heterogeneous expectations from heterogeneous preferences.
There are, however, obvious exceptions: the resistance to nuclear power in the West, especially, has been shown repeatedly to be strongly correlated with perceptions of danger. 77 With respect to nuclear power and genetic engineering, society is clearly divided into optimists and pessimists, whose subjective probability density functions 
Systemic Resistance
A different reason why society might resist innovation that seems attractive on the surface has to do with cross-technique spillover effects. As we have seen, all evolutionary systems have some source of resistance to change or else they might collapse into the indeterminacy Kauffman describes as his Asupracritical region.@ 81 Yet the technological choices offer some sources of inertia that are not found in nature. Unlike biology, industry can mold its own selection environment by the development of rules of behavior that evolve spontaneously but the purpose of which is presumably to preserve the status quo and protect existing firms. Technology, too, occurs in Asystems@ meaning basically that components that are changed will have effects on other parts with which they interact. This implies that a change in technique from T 0 to T 1 is likely to change costs subsequent to its adoption through unintended consequences to other components. Many of these occur through a variety of externalities or network effects: electrical equipment, trains, software, farming in open field agriculture, all shared the problem of interrelatedness. In order to work, they require a uniformity we call standardization, and thus single members cannot change a component without adhering to the standards. Yet here, too, the analogy can be pressed too far: in technology --but not in nature --we can invent "gateway" technologies in which the incompatibilities are overcome, including for instance electrical convertors from 115V to 220V or railroad cars with adjustable axes that traveled on different gauges. Positive feedback traps can occur in technological systems, but tend to be rare in open economies because of competitive pressures from outside. Yet they do occur: American color TV has been Astuck@ now for decades at a low quality screen (of a low definition). IBM-based computers still struggle with the often paralyzing constraint of 640 K RAM in Aconventional memory,@ the nemesis of computer games and many multi-media applications. In both cases it has turned out to be costly and tricky but not impossible to devise a Agateway@ solution.
The complementarities involved (broadcast-reception in the case of TV; software-hardware in the case of computers) are characteristics of one of the most often occurring sources of technological inertia in history: frequency dependence. 83 A new technique cannot be successful until it is already adopted by a sufficiently large number of users. Similarly, in natural selection, new species cannot propagate unless they can mate with a sufficiently similar creature. This kind of model sounds almost discouraging, since in its strictest sense it means that only success succeeds, a blueprint for total stasis. Obviously, in some cases this hurdle can and has been overcome, but it should alert us that in normal situations new technological ideas that might on the face of them work well do not Acatch on@ and eventually vanish without a trace. IBM's OS/2 operating system, much superior to MS/DOS, was rejected because it was not sufficiently Acompatible,@ as were DAT tape players and Betasystem VCR's. 84 A special case of frequency dependence is learning by doing, where average costs decline with cumulative output. It is not always possible to know exactly how important these learning effects would have been in products that never made it mass production. They are the outcome of an experiment never performed.
Would airships have become safe and fast (in addition to being quiet and fuel-efficient) had the world of aviation have put up as good a competition to the four-stroke internal combustion engine as the Diesel engine? Could the same be said for two-stroke engines, Wankel engines, and so on?
Concluding Remarks.
One of the main re-discoveries of the new growth theory and recent thinking about economic development is the possibility of the poverty trap or multiple equilibria. Another way of thinking about the issues discussed in this paper is that it is possible for an economy to be Astuck@ at a low level of income because the institutions it has are somehow inappropriate for technological progress. Usually the literature has thought of institutions as affecting the allocation of resources or the formation of capital. As technological progress, both home-made and imported, is still regarded as one of the main engines of growth, the suitability of institutions to the successful adoption of new ideas is an important question. Simple economic models may be difficult to construct here, but by a combination of political economy with the lessons of economic history, some insights into the causes and consequences of resistance and opposition to technological change can be drawn. The deeper question is whether sustained economic growth is the exception and stagnation the default, or whether, as argued especially by E.L. Jones in his Growth Recurring, economic growth is a natural condition for most economies, but more often than not political and cultural impediments drag an inherently dynamic economy into stagnation and poverty. This debate may seem to some a bit like an argument whether a zebra is black with white stripes or the other way around. In either case, the political economy of technological progress must occupy its rightful place at center stage.
